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Whither Weber?
Michael J. Yelnosky*
The Taxman case sparked passionate discussions about 1) all
forms of affirmative action, 2) the value of diversity, 3) the persis-
tence of discrimination, 4) the role of the workplace in furthering
democratic principles, 5) employer prerogatives and congressional
power, 6) "test" cases, and other important issues. What struck me
about these discussions, most notably those among lawyers or law
professors, was the absence of any reference to Title VII or the
Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence. With the possible excep-
tion of Title VII aficionados, it appears that lawyers are not famil-
iar with the Supreme Court's only Title VII affirmative action
cases, Weber and Johnson.' I came away from many of these dis-
cussions with the impression that most lawyers think the Supreme
Court has declared broadly that affirmative action is lawful under
Title VII, and that the Court in Taxman would have to dramati-
cally "undo" the law of affirmative action to affirm the Third Cir-
cuit's conclusion.
That view misconstrues Weber and Johnson. Some time ago,
in preparing a talk entitled "The Diversity Justification for Affirm-
ative Action" I read, perhaps for the first time, but certainly for the
first time in many years, the unedited opinions in Weber and John-
son. What I found there explains in large measure how I drafted
the mock opinion that follows.
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.S. 1982,
University of Vermont; J.D. 1987, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Spe-
cial thanks to Ann McGinley for participating in this exercise with me. Thanks
also to Laurie Barron, Samuel Estreicher and Charles Sullivan for their comments
on my drafts. Finally, I am indebted to the editors of the Roger Williams Univer-
sity Law Review for their tolerance of my chronic failure to meet their reasonable
deadlines.
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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I. THE MEANING OF WEBER
By a vote of 5-2 the Court in Weber held that an affirmative
action plan that reserved for black employees 50% of the openings
in an in-plant craft training program was lawful under Title VII. 2
But the Court endorsed the plan cautiously. The majority ac-
knowledged that the plan would violate the "literal" terms of the
statute,3 but it could not bring itself to read Title VII to be "the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hi-
erarchy."4 The plan approved in Weber was designed to abolish
such a pattern because the craft unions in the area from which the
employer drew its work force had intentionally discriminated
against black workers. Thus, only 1.83% of the skilled craft work-
ers at the plant were black, while the work force in the area was
39% black.5 Justice Blackmun, the fifth vote for approving the
plan, wrote a separate concurrence, in which he acknowledged
"misgivings" about the extent to which the legislative history of Ti-
tle VII supported the Court's result.6 He joined the majority never-
theless because its approach seemed to him a practical and
equitable approach to the problem of work force segregation, and
because "if the Court has misperceived the political will, it has the
assurance that because the question is statutory Congress may set
a different course if it so chooses."7
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Weber, explaining that Title VII explicitly prohibits race discrimi-
nation, without any exception for affirmative action plans, and
that nothing in the legislative history suggests Congress meant to
exempt affirmative action plans from the reach of the statute.,
The other members of the Court, Justice Powell and Justice Ste-
vens, did not participate in Weber.
In Johnson, decided eight years later, the Court, "guided" by
Weber, declared lawful an affirmative action plan intended to re-
2. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
3. Id. at 201.
4. Id. at 204.
5. See id. at 198-99.
6. Id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 216.
8. Id. at 216-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 219-54 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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dress an underrepresentation of women in the defendant's work
force. 9 In Johnson the Court purported to apply rather than ex-
pand the narrow exception recognized in Weber. The five Justices
in the majority concluded that the employer's decision to consider
the sex of qualified applicants for promotion "satisfie[d] the first
requirement enunciated in Weber, since it was undertaken to fur-
ther an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate ... work force
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories."10 Moreover,
as the Court had in Weber, the Court in Johnson then concluded
that the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the rights of nonmi-
nority workers or create an absolute bar to their advancement."
Two current members of the Court wrote concurrences in
Johnson. Justice Stevens, who sat out in Weber, voted with the
majority in Johnson, but he also wrote a concurrence to express his
views about Weber.' 2 Prior to Weber, he explained, the Court had
always read Title VII to prohibit discriminatory preference for
whites or blacks.' 3 Weber's new construction of Title VII was at
odds with his understanding of the legislative intent, 14 but Justice
Stevens chose to follow Weber in the interests of "'stability and or-
derly development of the law."'" 5 Although Justice Stevens has
gone on to become the Court's "diversity champion,"16 his views of
the appropriateness of the holding in Weber may say something
about the likelihood that a majority of the current Court will read
Weber narrowly or broadly.
Justice O'Connor was the other concurring Justice in Johnson
who is currently on the Court. She too expressed misgivings about
the Court's decision in Weber, noting that the majority there read
the statute to permit "what its language read literally would pro-
hibit."17 She chose to follow Weber because none of the parties in
Johnson had suggested it be overruled,' and because to do other-
wise would "fail[] to reckon with the reality of the course that the
9. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627.
10. Id. at 637.
11. Id. at 637-38.
12. Id. at 642-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
13. See id. at 642-43.
14. See id. at 643-44.
15. Id. at 644 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
16. See infra pp. 266-67.
17. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
18. Id. at 648.
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majority of the Court has determined to follow."19 She refused to
join the majority opinion because it was, to her mind, an unwar-
ranted extension of Weber. 20 It would permit an employer to make
employment decisions otherwise prohibited by Title VII based sim-
ply on an imbalance in the work force, even if that imbalance did
not suggest the employer might have previously discriminated
against women or minorities. 21 For Justice O'Connor, an affirma-
tive action plan was not lawful under Title VII unless the employer
had a "firm basis" for believing that remedial action was
required. 22
Two other Justices currently on the Court participated in
Johnson. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in a
dissent in which they urged the Court to overrule Weber because it
was directly contrary to the language and legislative history of Ti-
tle VII.23 Justice White also dissented. Although he had voted
with the majority in Weber, he voted to overrule it in Johnson.24
He believed the majority in Johnson read Weber to permit the use
of affirmative action for reasons other than to remedy intentional
and systematic exclusion of blacks, and that was "a perversion of
Title VII."25
Thus, contrary to the common perception I encountered in
many discussions about Taxman, a close review of the Supreme
Court's only Title VII affirmative action decisions reveals thin sup-
port for even the limited exception recognized in Weber and applied
in Johnson. One of the five members of the Weber majority (Jus-
tice Blackmun) expressed concern at the time that the Court was
misinterpreting the statute26 and another (Justice White) voted to
overrule Weber eight years later.27 One member of the Court at
the time of Weber who could not participate (Justice Stevens) sub-
sequently explained that he too thought Weber was probably
wrong.28 And Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the result in
19. Id. at 648-49.
20. See id. at 649.
21. See id. at 649-57.
22. Id. at 649.
23. See id. at 657-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
27. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 644-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Johnson, suggested that Weber did not stand on solid footing and
therefore read the case to recognize only a narrow exception to the
antidiscrimination principle of Title VII.29 Those who would read
Weber and Johnson to create a broad "affirmative action exception"
to Title VII must acknowledge this reality.
II. COUNTING THE VOTES
Because four members of the current Court participated in
Weber or Johnson or both, (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ste-
vens, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia) it is fairly easy to pre-
dict how they might have voted in Taxman. I looked to the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence for additional guidance, and in par-
ticular to help me predict how the other Justices would vote.30
A. Affirm the Third Circuit and Preserve Weber and Johnson
Justice O'Connor
I chose to have Justice O'Connor write an opinion concluding
that the Board's actions violated Title VII but refusing to overrule
Weber and Johnson. This approach seems consistent with her con-
currence in Johnson. There she respected the Court's prior deci-
sion in Weber but read it to create a relatively narrow exception to
Title VII, permitting affirmative action plans only if they are reme-
dial, in the sense that they are directed at redressing a serious
underrepresentation of women or minorities in an employer's work
force relative to the relevant labor market.31 Her unwillingness to
permit race-conscious decisions outside this "remedial" context is
also evident in her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission,32 where the Court concluded that
an FCC preference program, intended to increase the number of
television and radio broadcasting licenses issued to minority-
owned or controlled firms, did not violate the Fifth Amendment. In
her Metro Broadcasting dissent Justice O'Connor wrote that
"[miodern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one [com-
pelling interest to support the Government's use of racial classifi-
29. Id. at 648-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
30. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43
UCLA L. Rev. 1745 (1996) (analyzing Supreme Court affirmative action decisions).
31. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 648-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
32. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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cations]: remedying the effects of racial discrimination."33 Perhaps
even more relevant is her statement in Metro Broadcasting that
"[wie would not tolerate the Government's claim that hiring per-
sons of a particular race leads to better service... and we should
not accept as legitimate the FCC's claim in these cases that mem-
bers of certain races will provide superior programming. .... 34
One difficulty in trying to predict how Justice O'Connor would
react to Taxman arises from the context of the case-public educa-
tion. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,35 the Court held
that a school board could not, consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause, layoff teachers based on race rather than seniority in order
to maintain a mix of black and white teachers keyed to the racial
mix of the student body. While joining the plurality in concluding
that societal discrimination and role-modeling were not sufficient
bases for making race-based employment decisions,36 Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to distinguish the impermissible goal of
providing role models with what she called "the very different goal
of promoting racial diversity among the faculty."37
I concluded that if Justice O'Connor voted to affirm the Third
Circuit in Taxman she could emphasize that on the record before it
the district court could only conclude that the faculty at Piscat-
away High School was already racially diverse. Moreover, she
could explain that the Board did not show why racial diversity in
the Business Education Department at an otherwise racially di-
verse high school was important. I tried to reconcile her approach
in Johnson limiting the use of affirmative action to "remedial" situ-
ations with her statement in Wygant endorsing faculty diversity by
having her explain that a lack of racial diversity in a faculty could
be redressed under Johnson if the imbalance was of sufficient
magnitude.
Finally, in Wygant Justice O'Connor seemed to reject the prop-
osition that a valid affirmative action plan could never rely on lay-
offs to achieve its goals. She did not join the section of the
plurality's opinion that came close to adopting such an approach, 38
33. Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 620.
35. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
36. See id. at 274-77 (plurality).
37. Id. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
38. See id. at 278-84 (plurality).
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and she explicitly refused to "resolve the troubling questions
whether any layoff provision could survive strict scrutiny."39 In
her mock opinion in Taxman I chose to have her again refuse to
decide that question. Instead I had her write that under the cir-
cumstances, where the purpose of the plan was improper, Sharon
Taxman was tenured, and the plan in question had no stopping
point, the Board's decision to discharge her unnecessarily tram-
meled Taxman's rights.
Justice Kennedy
I predicted that Justice Kennedy would join Justice
O'Connor's opinion based in part on his decision to join her dissent
in Metro Broadcasting. There, you will recall, she asserted that
modern equal protection doctrine has deemed only an interest in
remedying the effects of racial discrimination to be sufficiently
compelling to support the government's use of racial
classifications.40
In addition, Justice Kennedy wrote his own dissent in Metro
Broadcasting to criticize the majority's willingness to permit the
FCC to use race-conscious measures to further an interest in
"broadcast diversity."41 In his view, the stereotypical assumption
that the race of the owner of a broadcast license is linked to broad-
cast content was "based on the demeaning notion that members of
... racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be
different from those of other citizens."42 Thus, I concluded that he
would not approve of the Board's action in Taxman. However, I
also concluded that because of his respect for precedent he would
not join the Justices voting to overrule Weber and Johnson.43
39. Id. at 293 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
40. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497
U.S. 547, 612, 632-37 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 632 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 636.
43. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 519 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that be-
cause "a rule of automatic invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case
would be a significant break with our precedents that require a case-by-case test, I
am not convinced we need adopt it at this point").
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Justice Souter and Justice Breyer
My decision to have these Justices join in Justice O'Connor's
opinion affirming the Third Circuit in Taxman is based on their
positions in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena." The Adarand
majority concluded that federal programs granting race-based
preferences were subject to strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amend-
ment.45 Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented.
However, Souter and Breyer did not join a separate dissent by Ste-
vens and Ginsburg that embraced the diversity justification for af-
firmative action.
In that dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that a majority of the
Court in Metro Broadcasting had correctly held that reliance on
race in granting licenses was a legitimate means of achieving
broadcast diversity.46 Along with Justice Ginsburg, he asserted
that the majority in Adarand was overruling Metro Broadcasting
only to the extent that the Court in Metro Broadcasting held that
"benign" racial classifications were not subject to strict scrutiny.47
The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a suffi-
cient interest to justify ... a[n affirmative action] program is
not inconsistent with the Court's holding today-indeed, the
question is not remotely presented in this case-and I do not
take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our deci-
sion in Metro Broadcasting.48
By contrast, Justice Souter's dissent, which Justice Breyer
joined, made no mention of the diversity justification for affirma-
tive action. Instead he explained how the majority's approach in
Adarand should not jeopardize the use of race to eliminate or rem-
edy the past effects of discrimination.49 The price paid by nonmi-
norities in these circumstances, he explained, is considered
reasonable. 50 "[11f the justification for the preference is eliminat-
ing the effects of a past practice, the assumption is that the effects
will themselves recede into the past, becoming attenuated and fi-
nally disappearing."5' Moreover, Justice Breyer joined a separate
44. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
45. Id. at 236.
46. See id. at 254-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 258.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 270 (Souter, J., dissenting).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 270.
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dissent authored by Justice Ginsburg that also focussed on reme-
dial uses of race-conscious measures. She explained that all mem-
bers of the Court acknowledged "Congress' authority to act
affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to counteract
discrimination's lingering effects,"52 so long as "[clourt review can
ensure that preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly
upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legit-
imate expectations of persons in once preferred groups."53
Thus, it appears that both Justice Breyer and Justice Souter
would be comfortable with a view of Title VII affirmative action
limited to Weber's search for 1) a remedial purpose, and 2) means
that do not unnecessarily harm nonminorities. It does not appear
they would support extending Weber to permit employers to make
all forms of race-conscious employment decisions to further an in-
terest in diversity.
B. Affirm the Third Circuit and Overrule Weber and Johnson
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
Predicting how Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
would vote in Taxman was easy. Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented in Weber on the grounds that Title VII did not contain an
affirmative action exception to its prohibition on discrimination in
employment and nothing in the legislative history suggested that
Congress intended to include such an exception.54 Later, in John-
son, he was joined by Justice Scalia in urging the Court to overrule
Weber.55
Justice Thomas
I concluded Justice Thomas would likely provide a third vote
to overrule Weber and Johnson because of his concurring opinion in
Adarand, in which he explained that "there is a 'moral [and] con-
stitutional equivalence,' . . . between laws designed to subjugate a
race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order
to foster some current notion of equality."5 6 His view of equal pro-
52. Id. at 273 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 276.
54. Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (citation omitted).
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tection comports with a literal interpretation of the language of Ti-
tle VII that would require the Court to overrule Weber and
Johnson. To Justice Thomas, "racial discrimination based on be-
nign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by ma-
licious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain
and simple."5 7
C. Reverse the Third Circuit
Justice Stevens
Given his opinion in Johnson it is also fairly easy to predict
how Justice Stevens would have voted in Taxman. While he ex-
pressed misgivings in Johnson about the Court's decision in Weber,
"[gliven the interpretation of the statute the Court adopted in
Weber, [he saw no reason an employer should be required, before
granting] preference to a qualified minority employee, to deter-
mine whether his past conduct might constitute an arguable viola-
tion of Title VII."5 8 Instead of looking backward at past
discrimination to determine the outer limits of affirmative action,
he explained, an employer might consider other legitimate reasons
to give preferences to members of underrepresented groups, in-
cluding "'increasing the diversity of the work force."' 59
For example, he wrote in Wygant:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that
a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-
white, faculty .... It is one thing for a white child to be
taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only "skin
deep"; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a
day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learning
process.60
Similarly, in his concurrence in Metro Broadcasting embracing the
diversity justification for affirmative action, he concluded that "the
public interest in... diversity in the composition of a public school
57. Id. at 241.
58. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 646-47 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimi-
nation: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 96 (1986)).
60. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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faculty... is in my view unquestionably legitimate."6 ' Finally, in
his dissent in Adarand, which is discussed above, he asserted that
the majority's embrace of the diversity rationale for affirmative ac-
tion in Metro Broadcasting was not affected by the holding in
Adarand.62
Justice Ginsburg
I predicted that Justice Ginsburg would join Justice Stevens in
Taxman because she joined his dissent in Adarand seeking to pre-
serve the diversity holding of Metro Broadcasting.63
III. AN ASIDE ON THE ABSENCE OF A RACE-BASED
BFOQ DEFENSE
Finally, another aspect of Title VII that I found was largely
ignored in the discussions of Taxman is the so-called "bona fide
occupational qualification defense." Under section 703(e)(1) of the
act, an employer can engage in intentional discrimination "on the
basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain in-
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualfication reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise."64 In omitting discrimina-
tion on the basis of race from the reach of the BFOQ, Congress
made it clear it would not tolerate race discrimination in employ-
ment even if an employer could show that discrimination furthered
its operational goals.65 While some commentators assume there
must be an implied "necessity exception" to the limited reach of the
BFOQ,66 the absence of a race-based BFOQ presents a problem for
those who would read Title VII to permit an employer to make
race-conscious, employment decisions to produce better products or
provide better services to its customers, or, as in Taxman, to better
educate its students. 67
61. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
62. See supra pp. 264-65.
63. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
65. See Kingsley R. Browne, Nonremedial Justifications for Affirmative Action
in Employment: A Critique of the Justice Department Position, 12 Lab. Law. 451,
467 (1997).
66. See, e.g., Mack A. Player, Employment Discrimination Law 284 (1988).
67. An interesting aspect of the inclusion of sex in the BFOQ and the exclu-
sion of race is that it might give an employer more freedom to take affirmative
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steps to favor women than African-Americans. This aspect of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence was criticized by Justice Stevens in Adarand, where he
wrote that using strict scrutiny to test the legality of benign race-based classifica-
tions and intermediate-level scrutiny for sex-based classifications might give gov-
ernments more freedom to favor women than minorities. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at
247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF PISCATAWAY,
PETITIONER,
V.
SHARON TAXMAN,
RESPONDENT.
O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and de-
livered an opinion in which KENNEDY, SOUTER, AND BREYER
J.J., joined, and Part IV of which was also joined by REHNQUIST,
C.J., SCALIA, AND THOMAS, J.J.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court.
This case involves a Title VII challenge to the decision of Peti-
tioner Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway ("Board")
to use race to determine which of two equally qualified teachers
should be laid off during a reduction in force.
I
A.'
In the Spring of 1989 Petitioner Board accepted the recom-
mendation of the Superintendent of Schools that it eliminate one
teaching position in the Business Education Department of Piscat-
away High School. Under New Jersey law the Board was obliged
to first lay off untenured faculty. If only tenured faculty were af-
fected by a particular reduction, layoffs were to proceed in reverse
order of seniority. Where seniority was equal, the Board had the
discretion to choose among tenured faculty.
The junior teachers in the Business Education Department at
Piscataway High School, Debra Williams and Respondent Sharon
Taxman, were both tenured, and Williams and Taxman were in a
seniority tie. Both were hired on September 1, 1980. In order to
break the tie, the Board exercised its discretion to consider the
teachers' classroom performance, evaluations, volunteer activity,
1. The facts recited here come from the stipulations of the parties submitted
in the District Court with their cross-motions for summary judgment.
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and teaching certifications. However, after its review the Board
concluded that Williams and Taxman were "two teachers of equal
ability" and "equal qualifications." The Board had drawn lots in
the past to break similar ties, but it decided not to use that ap-
proach in this case.
Debra Williams is black, and Sharon Taxman is white. The
Superintendent of Schools recommended that the Board invoke its
affirmative action policy to break the tie. The predecessor to that
policy was adopted in 1975 in response to a directive from the New
Jersey State Board of Education to each school district in the state
to adopt affirmative action programs to address employment and
classroom practices and to ensure equal opportunity to all persons.
In 1989 the policy, which applied to "every aspect of employment,
including ... layoffs," provided that "the most qualified candidate
will be recommended .... However, when candidates appear to be
of equal qualification, candidates meeting the criteria of the affirm-
ative action program will be recommended." The phrase "candi-
dates meeting the criteria of the affirmative action program"
referred to members of racial, national origin or gender groups
identified as minorities for statistical reporting purposes by the
New Jersey State Department of Education, including blacks.
The Board did not adopt the policy to remedy its own prior
discrimination (in fact there was no evidence of any prior discrimi-
nation by the Board) or in response to an identified under-
representation of minorities within the Piscataway public school
system. Statistical analyses from 1976 and 1985 showed that the
percentage of black employees in the job category that included
teachers exceeded the percentage of blacks in the available work
force and concluded that the school district was not underutilizing
blacks in its professional work force.2 Blacks were not under-
represented in the teacher work force at the Piscataway High
School, where both Williams and Taxman were employed, and they
would not have been underrepresented if Williams had been
terminated.
2. In 1976 an analysis of minority employment in the job category of "profes-
sional," which includes teachers, revealed that minorities comprised 7.4% of the
statewide pool of persons with the requisite skills for professional positions and
10% of the Board's professional work force. A January 1985 analysis similarly
showed that 5.8% of the available labor market for educational professionals in
Middlesex County, which contains Piscataway, was black, while 9.5% of the educa-
tional professionals employed by the Board were black.
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On May 22, 1989 the Board voted to use the affirmative action
policy to break the tie between Williams and Taxman, and it termi-
nated Sharon Taxman effective June 30, 1989.3 The Superinten-
dent of Schools supported the decision because Williams was "the
only black teacher in the [ten-teacher] Business Education Depart-
ment." The Board's President supported the decision because "it
was valuable for the students to see in the various employment
roles a wide range of background and... it was also valuable to the
work force and in particular the teaching staff." He continued,
"there is a distinct advantage to ... all students, to ... come into
contact with people of different cultures, different backgrounds, so
that they are more aware, more tolerant, more accepting, more un-
derstanding of people of all backgrounds."
B.
On June 8, 1989, Taxman filed discrimination charges with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and
the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights, asserting that the Board's
race-based decision to terminate her was unlawful. The EEOC
charge was referred to the United States Department of Justice.
Thereafter, the United States filed a Title VII suit against the
Board in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. The District Court later granted Taxman's motion to inter-
vene as a party plaintiff, and she filed a complaint invoking the
protections of Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination.
Although the Board conceded that it took race into account in
deciding to terminate Taxman, after discovery it moved for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that its actions were taken pursuant
to a valid affirmative action plan. The United States and Taxman
filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to liability only. The
District Court determined that the plan was invalid as a matter of
law, and it granted summary judgment to the United States and
3. The Board's Director of Personnel, Gordon Moore, informed Respondent
Taxman by letter that:
The board of education has decided to rely on its commitment to affirma-
tive action as a means of breaking the tie in seniority entitlement in the
secretarial studies category. As a result, the board, at its regular meeting
on the evening of May 22, 1989, acted to abolish one teaching position and
to terminate your employment as a teaching staff member effective June
30, 1989.
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Taxman. 832 F. Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1993). The District Court read
this Court's prior decisions in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616 (1987) as requiring an affirmative action plan to satisfy two
conditions to survive Title VII scrutiny: 1) the plan must have
been adopted for a proper purpose, and 2) it must not unnecessa-
rily trammel the rights of nonminority employees. 832 F. Supp. at
844.
With respect to the "proper purpose" inquiry, the Board sought
to justify the plan on the grounds that it was adopted to promote
racial diversity in an otherwise all-white department at a high
school "for education's sake" or "as an educational goal." The Dis-
trict Court concluded that Title VII did not permit a race-conscious
affirmative action plan to foster "faculty diversity for education's
sake" because Weber and Johnson permitted affirmative action
plans only to respond to a manifest imbalance in the numbers of
women or minorities in a work force. No such imbalance existed in
the teacher work force of the Piscataway public schools. Id. at 848.
The District Court explained that the affirmative action plan
did not satisfy the second prong of Weber and Johnson because of
its impact on Taxman. It held that invoking the plan to terminate
Taxman's employment imposed an intolerable burden on her be-
cause she had a legitimate and firmly rooted expectation in contin-
ued employment. The Court distinguished this effect on Taxman
from the effect of the plans approved in Weber and Johnson, in
which race was considered for the purpose of making hiring or pro-
motion decisions. Id. at 849-850. Finally, the District Court held
that the plan was deficient because its serious effects were not tem-
porary. According to its terms the plan was to continue indefi-
nitely - it was not scheduled to "be reassessed with any regularity
or, for that matter, at all." Id. at 850.
After a trial on damages, the District Court awarded Taxman
$134,014.62 on her Title VII claim for back pay, fringe benefits and
prejudgment interest. Because she had been rehired by the Board
while the case was pending, reinstatement was not an issue, but
the Court ordered the Board to give Taxman full seniority credit as
if she had no break in service. Ajury awarded Taxman $10,000 for
emotional suffering under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination.
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The Board appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, contending that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment to the United States and Taxman
and in awarding Taxman 100% back pay under Title VII.4 The
United States withdrew from the case while the appeal was pend-
ing because it no longer supported the judgment of the District
Court.5
By a vote of 8-4 an en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's judgment. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996). The majority
approached the case in much the same way as the District Court,
identifying the dispositive issue as the validity of the Board's af-
firmative action plan under Weber and Johnson. The majority de-
termined that the District Court correctly concluded that the
Board's plan was not adopted for a proper purpose because "unless
an affirmative action plan has a remedial purpose, it cannot be
said to mirror the purpose of [Title VIII, and, therefore, cannot sat-
isfy the first prong of the Weber test." Id. at 1557. It found itself
constrained to hold, as did the district court, that inasmuch
as "the Board does not even attempt to show that its affirma-
tive action plan was adopted to remedy past discrimination or
as the result of a manifest imbalance in the employment of
minorities," the Board has failed to satisfy the first prong of
the Weber test.
Id. at 1563 (citation omitted)."
As the District Court had, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the Board's policy also unnecessarily trammeled the interests of
nonminority employees. It explained that the Board's policy
lacked "definition and structure." Id. at 1564. In its view, the
Board had "abdicate [d] its responsibility to define 'racial diversity'
4. The Board also claimed on appeal that the District Court incorrectly calcu-
lated prejudgment interest on the back pay award to Taxman. Taxman cross-ap-
pealed, contending that the District Court erred in dismissing her claim for
punitive damages under New Jersey law.
5. The United States actually sought leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in
support of the Board's request for reversal of the District Court's judgment. The
Court of Appeals denied that request, treated it as a motion to withdraw, and
granted the motion. Before this Court the United States as amicus curiae now
argues again in support of the District Court's judgment.
6. "Although we applaud the goal of racial diversity," Judge Mansmann
wrote for the majority, "we cannot agree that Title VII permits an employer to
advance that goal through non-remedial discriminatory measures." 91 F.3d at
1567.
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and to determine what degree of racial diversity in the Piscataway
High School is sufficient." Id. Moreover, the Board's policy was
"an established fixture of unlimited duration, to be resurrected
from time to time whenever the Board believes that the ratio be-
tween Blacks and Whites in any Piscataway School is skewed." Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
the harm imposed upon a nonminority employee by the loss of
his or her job is so substantial and the cost so severe that the
Board's goal of racial diversity, even if legitimate under Title
VII, may not be pursued in this particular fashion... espe-
cially . . . where, as here, the nonminority employee is
tenured.
Id.
On the issue of damages, the Board argued on appeal that the
District Court's award of 100% back pay was unwarranted because
had the Board not invoked the affirmative action plan, it would
have used a random process, such as a coin toss, to break the tie.
In a random process Taxman stood only a fifty percent chance of
keeping her job. The majority concluded that the District Court's
award was within its discretion because it "most closely approxi-
mates the conditions that would have prevailed in the absence of
discrimination." Id. at 1565-1566.7
Judge Sloviter filed a dissent joined by three other members of
the Court. The dissenters read Weber and Johnson to permit not
just remedial affirmative action plans, but all those "consistent
with and in furtherance of the broad statutory goal of eliminating
the causes of discrimination." Id. at 1571 (Sloviter, C.J., dissent-
ing). The Board's plan satisfied this requirement, in their view,
because "racial diversity in the classroom [is] an important means
of combatting the attitudes that can lead to future patterns of dis-
crimination." Id. at 1572.
The dissenters concluded that the plan did not unnecessarily
trammel Taxman's interests because had the Board's decision not
been race-conscious, Taxman would have had only a fifty percent
chance of avoiding the layoff. That "chance," they reasoned, was
not a "legitimate and firmly rooted expectation" in continued em-
ployment. Id. at 1574 (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638). More-
7. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court's calculation of pre-
judgment interest and its decision to dismiss Taxman's claim for punitive damages
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.
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over, Taxman retained recall rights after the layoff and was
subsequently rehired. Id. Unlike the majority, the dissenters
found the discretionary nature of the Board's plan attractive. By
giving the Board the freedom to use race as a factor in employment
decisions only where the Board found it necessary to further the
educational mission of the Piscataway schools, the impact of the
plan on nonminorities was minimized. Id. at 1575.8
We granted certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997). We now affirm.
II
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) this Court held that despite Title VII's prohibition of em-
ployment discrimination "against any individual . . . because of
such individual's race," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), a covered em-
ployer could lawfully make certain race-conscious employment de-
cisions. Under Weber, Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious
affirmative action "to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories," 443 U.S. at 197, so long as
"the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white
employees." Id. at 208. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
U.S. 616 (1987) this Court held that the same rules govern the law-
fulness of affirmative action plans authorizing employers to make
employment decisions based on sex. Thus, the Court in Johnson
first considered whether the plan at issue there "was justified by
the existence of a 'manifest imbalance' that reflected an under-
representation of women in 'traditionally segregated job catego-
ries,'" id. at 631 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197), and then
whether the plan "unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male em-
ployees." Id. at 637-638. Weber and Johnson control the outcome
of this case, and they require that we affirm the Court of Appeals.
A.
At issue in Weber was an affirmative action plan collectively
bargained by a union and an employer that reserved for black em-
ployees 50% of the openings in an in-plant craft training program.9
8. Judges Scirica, Lewis and McKee, who joined Judge Sloviter's dissent,
each filed separate dissents emphasizing various aspects of the joint dissent.
9. Plaintiff was a white worker excluded from the program who had more
seniority than several blacks admitted to the program.
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Before it created the plan the employer filled craft positions with
experienced craft workers. However, because the local craft unions
excluded blacks, few had the requisite experience. Thus, only
1.83% of the skilled craft workers at the plant were black, while
the general work force in the area was 39% black. Weber, 443 U.S.
at 198-199. The affirmative action plan was scheduled to termi-
nate when the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the
plant approximated the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force. Id. at 198.
The majority in Weber approved the plan, rejecting "a literal
construction" of the statute in favor of one that it described as more
sensitive to the background, legislative history, and historical con-
text from which Title VII arose. Id. at 201. This broader construc-
tion was required because an interpretation of Title VII "that
forbade all race-conscious affirmative action would 'bring about an
end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute.'" Id. at
202 (citation omitted). That purpose "was to 'open employment op-
portunities for Negroes in occupations which have been tradition-
ally closed to them.'" Id. at 208 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548
(1964)) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Because the employer in
Weber created its plan to address the manifest racial imbalance in
its craft work force caused by the exclusion of Blacks from craft
unions, the Court held that the "purposes of the plan mirror[ed]
those of the statute." Id.
Eight years later, in Johnson, this Court held that Title VII
permitted an employer to consider as one factor the sex of a quali-
fied applicant for promotion to a position within a traditionally seg-
regated job classification in which women were significantly
underrepresented. 480 U.S. at 620-621, 641-642. The employer
had created an affirmative action plan in response to its finding
that women constituted 36.4% of the area labor market but 22.4%
of its work force, and that not one of its 238 Skilled Craft Worker
positions was held by a woman. Id. at 621. The plan "set aside no
specific number of positions for . . . women," id. at 622, but the
stated long-term goal or aspiration was to attain a work force
whose composition reflected the proportion of women in the area
labor force. Id. at 621-622.
This Court held that the employer did not violate Title VII
when it considered the sex of qualified applicants for the job of road
dispatcher, a Skilled Craft Position, and chose a qualified woman
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rather than a qualified man. The Court found that the decision to
promote the woman was made "pursuant to a plan prompted by
concerns similar to those of the employer in Weber." Id. at 631.
The employer's plan "was justified by the existence of 'a manifest
imbalance' that reflected underrepresentation of women in 'tradi-
tionally segregated job categories."' Id. (quoting Weber, 443 U.S.
at 197). Specifically, wrote the Court, "[gliven the obvious imbal-
ance in the Skilled Craft category, and given the [employer's] com-
mitment to eliminating such imbalances, it was plainly not
unreasonable for the [employer] to determine that it was appropri-
ate to consider as one factor ... sex.., in making its decision." Id.
at 637.
Applying the teachings of Weber and Johnson to this case, Re-
spondent met her burden of showing the Board's decision to dis-
charge her was unlawful.' 0 Petitioner urges the Court to read
Title VII to permit a school board to make race-conscious employ-
ment decisions to 1) reduce the risk that teachers or administra-
tors will discriminate against minority students, and 2) promote
understanding and tolerance among students. Notwithstanding
the importance of these goals, Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954) (education is "the very foundation of good citizenship"
and "a principal instrument in awakening the [student] to cultural
values," preparing her for participation as a political equal in a
pluralist democracy); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 313 (1978) ("the 'nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students
as diverse as this Nation of many peoples") (citation omitted), Title
VII forecloses a school board from pursuing them in the way Peti-
tioner did here.
Petitioner's arguments ignore the narrowness of the Court's
holdings in Weber and Johnson. In Weber, the Court read Title VII
to "permit what its language read literally would prohibit." John-
son, 480 U.S. at 647 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). That
language expressed Congress's intent to prohibit invidious dis-
crimination against any person on the basis of race or gender, but
the Court in Weber also found that Congress intended in Title VII
to eliminate the lasting effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 649.
10. If an employer defends against a Title VII charge of intentional discrimi-
nation by invoking an "affirmative action plan," the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the plan is invalid. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626.
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Thus, the Court relaxed Title VII's express prohibition on discrimi-
nation only to accommodate this unexpressed complementary ob-
jective. Contrary to Justice Stevens's views in Johnson, the Court
in Weber "did not approve preferences for minorities 'for any rea-
son that might seem sensible from a business or a social point of
view.'" Id. (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring))." "Instead of a wholly standardless approach to affirmative
action, the Court determined in Weber that Congress intended to
permit affirmative action only if the employer could point to a
'manifest . . . imbalanc[e] in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries."' Id. at 650 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 197). The majority in
Johnson explicitly stated that its decision "must be guided" by
Weber, id. at 627, and it adhered to the limits expressed in Weber,
concluding that the plan satisfied "the first requirement enunci-
ated in Weber, since it was undertaken to further an affirmative
action plan designed to eliminate. . . work force imbalances in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories." Id. at 637.
The dissent relies on statements made by the Court in Weber
that it did not intend to define the full range of affirmative action
plans permissible under Title VII. However, exclusive reliance on
those statements to justify broad use by employers of affirmative
action would ignore the reasoning that led the Court in Weber to
eschew "a literal reading" of Title VII and would be unfaithful to
that decision and the intent of Congress. A fairer reading of Weber,
Johnson, and Title VII emphasizes the antidiscrimination princi-
ple expressed clearly in Title VII and not implied exceptions to that
principle. Requiring that affirmative action be directed at rectify-
ing a manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories
"provides assurance both that sex or race will be taken into ac-
count in a manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminat-
ing the effects of employment discrimination, and that the
interests of those employees not benefitting from the plan will not
be unduly infringed." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631.
11. "[Sluch an approach would [be] wholly at odds with this Court's holding in
McDonald v. Sante Fe Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)] that Congress
intended to prohibit practices that operate to discriminate against the employment
opportunities of nonminorities as well as minorities." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). "Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is... what Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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Even if the Board had shown that laying off Sharon Taxman
(as contrasted with laying off Debra Williams) 1) reduced the like-
lihood that minority students at Piscataway High School would be
discriminated against by teachers and administrators, and 2) pro-
moted understanding and tolerance of human difference among
the students at Piscataway High School, § 703(e) of Title VII limits
a court's consideration of that showing. That provision exempts
from the statute's reach an employer's discrimination "on the basis
of.. . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (em-
phasis added). Notably absent from the types of discrimination
703(e) might justify is race discrimination. The limited scope of
this "BFOQ" defense to intentional discrimination makes apparent
Congress's determination to prohibit race discrimination by em-
ployers under all circumstances, including those that might some-
how be justified by an employer's operational needs. See also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) ("[a] demonstration that an employment
practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a
defense against a claim of intentional discrimination"). To expand
the legitimate purposes for race-based affirmative action beyond
the limits expressed in Weber and Johnson would ignore this ex-
press intention.12 Nowhere in Title VII or in this Court's decisions
in Weber and Johnson were employers made the ultimate arbiters
of when "it is desirable and benign... to disfavor some citizens and
favor others based on the color of their skin .... [Hlistory suggests
much peril in this enterprise." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
12. Petitioner urges the importance of the context in which this case arises -
public education. However, nothing in Title VII suggests that school boards mak-
ing employment decisions are exempt from the prohibition on race discrimination.
Prior to 1972, Title VII did not apply to public employers, and until that time ac-
tions like those taken by Petitioner would have been beyond the reach of Title VII.
However, "[wihile public employers were not added to the definition of 'employer'
in Title VII until 1972, there is no evidence that this mere addition to the defini-
tional section of the statute was intended to transform the substantive standard
governing employer conduct." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627-628 n.6. "Congress ex-
pressly indicated the intent that the same Title VII principles be applied to govern-
mental and private employers alike." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332
n.14 (1977). Thus, public employers are subject to the same standards imposed on
private employers by Weber, Johnson and the substantive provisions of Title VII,
including § 703(a) and (e).
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Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 637 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
Moreover, the Board's decision here was not supported by any
studies showing that minority students at Piscataway High School
received discriminatory treatment or that the school was failing in
its mission of teaching its students to be tolerant and understand-
ing of human difference. Similarly missing was any finding by the
Board that maintaining a racial balance in the Business Education
Department was necessary to reduce the incidence of discrimina-
tion or promote tolerance and understanding. And the Board
never identified the amount of diversity necessary to realize these
benefits. As the District Court stated, there was "no finding by the
Board or any other authority that the faculty [at the High School
was not] 'diverse.'" 832 F. Supp. at 850. Simply observing that
Williams was the only black teacher in the Business Education De-
partment or asserting that there is educational value in employing
teachers of different cultures and backgrounds would not be suffi-
cient to overcome the Title VII prohibition on race discrimination
in employment, even if the dissent's creation of a large, undefined
implied BFOQ for racial classifications thought to promote opera-
tional goals was the law.
Given that the Board never considered how its affirmative ac-
tion plan could achieve its asserted goals, the harm of race discrim-
ination in employment is evident on this record. The Board's
decision seems based, at least in part, on "the demeaning notion
that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 'mi-
nority views' that must be different from those of other citizens."
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The Board also seems to have retained Williams in favor of
Taxman in part to provide a minority role model for its minority
students. But "[clarried to its logical extreme, the idea that black
students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very
system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education." Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality). In
Wygant, this Court found the role-model justification for race-
based layoffs unlawful under the Equal Protection Clause because
it also "allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and
layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate re-
medial purpose." Id. at 275.
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While "the goal of providing 'role models' . . . should not be
confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity
among the faculty," Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment), that goal may be pur-
sued under Weber and Johnson where a school board can show a
manifest underrepresentation of black teachers in its work force.
However, the Board stipulated in the District Court that no such
imbalance existed. In fact, the percentage of black teachers in the
school district exceeded the percentage of blacks in the labor pool
from which the Board hired its teacher work force. The Board did
not argue that black teachers were underrepresented at Piscat-
away High School, nor did the Board try to show that even if there
was no underrepresentation in the teacher work force in the dis-
trict or at Piscataway High School, it was important that there be
no underrepresentation of black teachers in the Business Educa-
tion Department. The Board never evaluated the composition of
its teacher work force in this segmented way, so there is no reason
for this Court to consider whether the "manifest imbalance" test of
Weber and Johnson could justify affirmative action in a sub-cate-
gory of one category of an employer's work force. Suffice it to say
that Weber and Johnson give an employer considerable freedom to
exercise "management prerogatives" to use affirmative action
where the employer can show a relevant imbalance in its work
force. Under Weber and Johnson, for example, the Board's goals of
reducing discrimination against minority students and of teaching
understanding and tolerance could have been furthered if the
Board made the requisite showing of a manifest racial imbalance
in its work force and took reasonable steps to rectify that
imbalance.
B.
However, even if the Board's purpose in laying off Taxman was
permissible under Weber and Johnson, the District Court and the
Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Board's action was
unlawful because it unnecessarily trammeled Taxman's rights.
Under Weber and Johnson an affirmative action plan is lawful
only if it is directed to correcting a manifest imbalance in tradition-
ally segregated job categories and the plan does not "unnecessarily
trammel the interests" of nonminority employees. Weber, 443 U.S.
at 208; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630. The Court explained in Weber
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that the plan there, which reserved 50% of the places in an in-
plant training program for black workers, satisfied this require-
ment because it did not "require the discharge of white workers
and their replacement with new black hirees." Nor did "the plan
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees" be-
cause half of those trained in the program were white. Finally, the
plan was "not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to
eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." Weber, 433 U.S. at 208.
Similarly, this Court found that the plan in Johnson was lawful
because it "set[ I aside no positions for women" and sex was "but
one of numerous factors [taken] into account" in making the deci-
sion. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. Moreover, because the plaintiff in
Johnson "had no absolute entitlement to the [promotion] .... de-
nial of the promotion unsettled no legitimate, firmly rooted expec-
tation" on his part. Id. "[Hie retained his employment with the
Agency, at the same salary and with the same seniority, and re-
mained eligible for other promotions." Id. Finally, the plan was
intended to attain a balanced work force and not to maintain one,
establishing numerical goals "against which 'the employer [could]
measure its progress in eliminating the underrepresentation'" of
women in its work force. Id. at 639-640 (citation omitted).
Only one of the redeeming features of the plans in Weber and
Johnson is present in the Board's action here - no person was
automatically selected for layoff because of race; the seniority and
qualifications of the teachers were considered first. Thus, the
Board's plan did not create an absolute bar to the retention of
white employees in the event of a layoff, and it did not permit the
Board to make race a determining factor in employment decisions
unless the teachers in question were deemed equally qualified.
The remaining features of the Plan make it unlawful. The
Plan authorizes the Board to exact too high a price from nonmi-
nority employees in pursuit of vague benefits, and it authorizes the
Board to exact that price for an indeterminate period. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Weber and Johnson, Sharon Taxman lost her job. As a
general matter, while hiring and promotion goals like those in
Weber and Johnson "impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only
one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting
in serious disruption of their lives." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (plu-
rality). The Board's decision to discharge Taxman unsettled the
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legitimate, firmly rooted expectation in continued employment
that came with her tenure. Without concluding that an affirmative
action plan that authorizes race-based layoffs will always violate
Title VII, see id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment), we can say that the harm suffered by Ms.
Taxman, who lost her job as a tenured teacher because of her race,
was not justifiable. After making the investment in her career nec-
essary to earn the stability and security of tenure, the rights and
expectations that come with that status make up what could be
one of her valuable capital assets. Id. at 283 (plurality).
The Plan's threat to the rights obtained through tenure is
magnified by the Board's assertion that it can make race-based de-
cisions in its teacher work force indefinitely. In its Brief, Peti-
tioner asserted that where a school board uses affirmative action to
pursue a goal of racial diversity in its faculty, it must be free to
make race-based employment decisions at all times, for an indeter-
minate period, to assure that each and every student receives the
benefits of instruction by a racially diverse faculty. Petitioner's Re-
ply Brief on the Merits at 18-19. However, an affirmative action
program "that can be equated with a permanent plan of propor-
tionate representation by race and sex, would violate Title VII."
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 656.
Petitioner in effect argues that the expectation in continued
employment that came with Taxman's tenure evaporated once the
Board determined that she and Williams were equally qualified to
retain their jobs. At that point, according to Petitioner, Taxman
retained only the right to expect that the Board would make its
decision by tossing a coin or conducting some other "lottery." From
that vantage, Petitioner then asserts that "[rietaining a job by the
toss of a coin or by lottery is not, like seniority, a cornerstone of
modern employment relationships." Petitioner's Brief at 19.
But Petitioner's approach would give employers in the Board's
position the freedom to effectively revoke tenure by determining
that two or more tenured employees eligible for layoffs are equally
qualified. Moreover, it misconstrues the purpose of the inquiry
into legitimate expectations mandated by Weber and Johnson. All
employees, whether tenured or untenured, have the right to be free
from discrimination. Weber and Johnson tolerate certain race-con-
scious employment practices only where the harm associated with
violation of the antidiscrimination principle of Title VII is out-
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weighed by the benefits of rectifying a manifest racial imbalance in
a work force. Thus, the employer's freedom to take steps the stat-
ute would ordinarily forbid diminishes as the employee's interest
in continued employment increases. Given Sharon Taxman's sta-
tus as a tenured member of the faculty, Title VII required the
Board to make its difficult decision on some basis other than
Sharon Taxman's race.13
III
The concurring Justices would overrule Weber and Johnson
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the grounds
that Title VII forbids race and sex discrimination in employment
"simpliciter," Weber, 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
and contains no exception for "preferential treatment of minori-
ties." Id. at 222. However, to be faithful to this Court's normal
prudential restraints and the principle of stare decisis, this case
should be resolved in light of prior decisions upholding affirmative
action under some circumstances. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 648
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
Customarily we adhere faithfully to stare decisis in cases of
statutory interpretation. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 172-173 (1989) (stare decisis has "special force" in cases
of statutory interpretation). When Weber was decided, Justice
Blackmun, who joined the majority's opinion, wrote separately in
part to assure the dissenters that if in reading Title VII to permit
"moderate" affirmative action plans, the Court had "misperceived
the political will, it has the assurance that because the question is
statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses."
Weber, 443 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Almost 20
years have passed since this Court's decision in Weber, and over 10
years have passed since the decision in Johnson. Congress has not
amended Title VII to affect those decisions in that time. The force
of precedent here is further enhanced by Congressional amend-
13. Similarly, we reject the view of the dissenters in the Third Circuit that
because she retained recall rights after her layoff and was ultimately recalled,
Taxman's rights were not violated. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to
discharge an employee because of that employee's race. "Even a temporary layoff
may have adverse financial as well as psychological effects." Wygant, 476 U.S. at
283. For example, in the event of a future layoff, Taxman would be junior to
Williams.
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ments to Title VII since Weber and Johnson that did nothing to
modify the holdings in those cases. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286 (1998).
IV
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Taxman 100% of the
pay she lost as a result of the unlawful layoff. Once again, Peti-
tioner emphasizes that Taxman might have been laid off even if
the Board had not selected her for layoff because of her race. Peti-
tioner then argues that the District Court was required to discount
any back pay award to Taxman by a factor equal to that
probability. However, Petitioner's argument ignores the discretion
granted to a district court under Title VII to approximate a back
pay award that in its best judgment constitutes a just result in
light of the circumstances of a particular case. See Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-372 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-425 (1975). Under these circum-
stances, where Taxman was tenured and was performing well and
where she lost her job because of her race, a full backpay award
was not an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, Petitioner's rule would bar full backpay awards to
most successful Title VII plaintiffs. For example, as Petitioner
would have it, a black applicant for employment who proved that a
racist employer favored a white applicant would not be entitled to
a full back pay award unless she could also show that the employer
would have hired her absent this discriminatory motive. There is
no support in Title VII or our precedents for the novel regime Peti-
tioner envisions.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
It is so ordered
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE
SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment.
This Court's decisions in Weber and Johnson should be over-
ruled. By reading Title VII to permit employers to hire and pro-
mote employees based on race and sex, the majority in those cases
ignored the language and the legislative history of the statute.
The mere passage of time cannot correct these gross errors, and
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congressional inaction during that time does not prove judicial cor-
rectness. That Petitioner believed it could, consistent with Title
VII, discharge an employee because of the color of her skin in order
to further an ill-defined interest in "diversity," is evidence of the
danger of reading "into Title VII a tolerance for the very evil that
the law was intended to eradicate, without offering even a clue as
to what the limits on that tolerance may be." United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254-255 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The plurality has attempted to limit the damage of
Weber and Johnson by reading them narrowly, but their interpre-
tation serves only as "something of a halfway house between leav-
ing employers scot-free to discriminate against disfavored groups,
... and prohibiting discrimination, as do the words of Title VII."
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 665 n.4 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). We should complete the journey away from
Weber and Johnson, obey the language of the statute, and leave
this unfortunate chapter of Title VII jurisprudence behind.
In my dissent in Weber and in Justice Scalia's dissent in John-
son we explained in detail how the majority in those cases went
"not merely beyond, but directly against Title VII's language and
legislative history." Weber, 433 U.S. at 255 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Thus, only a brief recitation of the main points of those opin-
ions seems necessary.
Under 703(a) of Title VII, it is an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). "With a clarity which, had it not proven so
unavailing, one might well recommend as a model of statutory
draftsmanship," Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
"this language prohibits a covered employer from considering race
when making an employment decision, whether the race be black
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or white." Weber, 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976),
the Court unanimously concluded that the "uncontradicted legisla-
tive history" of Title VII supported the conclusion that Title VII
prohibits discrimination against whites to the same extent it pro-
hibits discrimination against blacks. "Not once during the... [leg-
islative] debate... did a speaker, proponent or opponent, suggest
that the bill would allow employers voluntarily to prefer racial mi-
norities over white persons." Weber, 443 U.S. at 244 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
The opponents of the legislation expressed a wholly different
concern. Notwithstanding the clarity of 703(a), they argued that it
could be read to require employers to correct racial imbalances
through the granting of preferential treatment to minorities. Sen-
ators Clark and Case, the floor captains of the bill in the Senate
that became Title VII explained that:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer main-
tain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any
deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever
such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII
because maintaining such a balance would require an em-
ployer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be
emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any
individual.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 239 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). Because these assurances did not satisfy those opponents,
§ 703(j) was added to Title VII. It provides that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to
require any employer,... subject to this subchapter to grant
preferential treatment to any individual or to any group be-
cause of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of any imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployed by any employer, . . . in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or
other area, or in the available work force in any community,
State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). Section 703(j) says nothing about voluntary
preferential treatment of minorities because such racial discrimi-
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nation was plainly proscribed by 703(a). Weber, 443 U.S. at 253
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In rejecting a "literal reading" of 703(a) and reading into
703(j) a non-existent expression of a non-existent desire on the
part of Congress to permit employers to intentionally discriminate
against certain disfavored groups,
Weber held that the legality of intentional discrimination...
is to be judged not by Title VII but by a judicially crafted code
of conduct, the contours of which are determined by no dis-
cernible standard, aside from .. .the divination of congres-
sional "purposes" belied by the face of the statute and by its
legislative history.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 670-671 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That "self-
promulgated code of conduct" was recast in Johnson, and the plu-
rality recasts it again today. We should instead overrule Weber
and Johnson and hold that Title VII means what it says. If we did
so, we would conclude simply that the Petitioner's intentional dis-
crimination against Respondent because of her race violated 703(a)
of Title VII. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
dissenting.
In adopting a categorical approach to the lawfulness of affirm-
ative action under Title VII the Court of Appeals misconstrued this
Court's decisions in Weber and Johnson. The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that "unless an affirmative action plan has a remedial pur-
pose, it cannot be said to mirror the purposes of the statute, and,
therefore, cannot satisfy the first prong of the Weber test." 91 F.3d
1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996). But nowhere in Weber or Johnson did
this Court state that affirmative action must have a remedial pur-
pose to be lawful under Title VII. The Court of Appeals also con-
cluded that "the harm imposed upon a nonminority employee by
the loss of his or her job is so substantial and the cost so severe
that.., even [a] legitimate [goal] under Title VII, may not be pur-
sued in this particular fashion." Id. at 1564. But nowhere in
Weber or Johnson did this Court state that all layoff decisions
made pursuant to an affirmative action plan are unlawful. I dis-
sent because a more nuanced and flexible approach is required by
this Court's precedents.
Since Weber this Court has unambiguously interpreted Title
VII to permit employers to voluntarily adopt special programs to
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benefit members of the minority groups for whose protection the
statute was invoked. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). Because of the un-
doubted public interest in "stability and orderly development of the
law," id., (citation omitted), I agree with the plurality that we
should adhere to the construction given Title VII in Weber and
Johnson. However, contrary to the plurality, I believe that con-
struction leaves more "breathing room" for employer initiatives to
benefit members of disadvantaged groups. Id. at 645.
Although this Court approved of an affirmative action plan in-
tended to remedy a racial imbalance in the employer's work force
in Weber and a gender imbalance in the employer's work force in
Johnson, this Court never stated that such a purpose was the only
permissible one for an affirmative action plan under Title VII. In
fact, the Court in Weber explicitly declined to "define in detail the
line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirm-
ative action plans." United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208 (1979). The Court in Johnson also did "not establish
the permissible outer limits of voluntary programs undertaken by
employers t6 benefit disadvantaged groups." Johnson, 480 U.S. at
642 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court of Appeals read limits
into Weber and Johnson despite the absence of limiting language
in this Court's decisions.
Moreover, the limits would prohibit a school board from giving
preference to members of underrepresented groups to diversify the
faculty and improve the quality of education in the school district.
This Court has previously noted the importance of diversity in edu-
cation and in other settings. Justice Powell first endorsed reliance
on race as a legitimate means of achieving diversity in the student
body of a public university in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311-320 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Later, in Wy-
gant, I wrote:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a
school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-
white, faculty .... It is one thing for a white child to be
taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only "skin
deep"; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a
day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.
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Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In that case Justice O'Connor also noted the possi-
bility that the Court might conclude that the "goal of promoting
racial diversity among the faculty" of a public high school, Wygant,
476 U.S. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) was sufficiently "compelling to sustain the use of
affirmative action policies." Id. at 286. Finally, a majority of the
Court recognized the importance of broadcast diversity in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S.
547 (1990), where it held that a federal program favoring minority
applicants for broadcast licenses was constitutional. The majority
reasoned that "just as a diverse student body contributing to a ro-
bust exchange of ideas is a constitutionally permissible goal on
which a race-conscious university admissions program may be
predicated... the diversity of views and information on the air-
waves serves important First Amendment values." Id. at 568 (cita-
tion omitted). That aspect of the Court's decision in Metro
Broadcasting was not affected by this Court's holding in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), that. federal pro-
grams granting race-based preferences must satisfy the require-
ments of strict scrutiny. Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Favoring an interpretation of Title VII that forces employers
under all circumstances to look backward for past discrimination
before offering help to a qualified minority employee is myopic and
premature, particularly without full consideration of other pur-
poses for affirmative action.
Public and private employers might choose to implement af-
firmative action for many reasons other than to purge their
own past sins of discrimination. The ... school board, ....
[might do] so in part to improve the quality of education...
whether by improving black students' performance or by dis-
pelling for black and white students alike any idea that white
supremacy governs our social institutions. Other employers
might advance different forward-looking reasons for affirma-
tive action: improving their services to black constituencies,
averting racial tension over the allocation of jobs in a commu-
nity, or increasing the diversity of a work force, to name but a
few examples. Or they might adopt affirmative action simply
to eliminate from their operations all de facto embodiment of
a system of racial caste. All of these reasons aspire to a ra-
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cially integrated future, but none reduces to "racial balancing
for its own sake."
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omit-
ted). "A [court] would be unreasonable to conclude that no other
consideration except a history of discrimination could ever warrant
a discriminatory measure unless every other consideration had
been presented to and rejected by [it]." Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d
916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996). In categorically refusing to consider non-
remedial purposes for voluntary affirmative action under Title VII
the Court of Appeals erred. A remand to that court is appropriate
for consideration of other purposes that are consistent with Title
VII and perhaps for further development of the record in the Dis-
trict Court.
A similar analysis requires a remand for more complete con-
sideration of the question whether the Board's action here unnec-
essarily trammeled Respondent's rights. The Court of Appeals
found that Respondent's layoff was dispositive of this question, but
again, under Weber and Johnson a more complicated analysis was
required. The plurality mentions three factors that Weber and
Johnson found relevant to this question: 1) whether the employer's
action upset a legitimate, firmly rooted expectation on behalf of the
adversely effected employees; 2) whether the affirmative action
plan was intended to maintain racial balance or simply to elimi-
nate a manifest racial imbalance; and 3) whether the plan created
an absolute bar to advancement of white employees or whether
race was simply a factor in making the decisions. Thus, even
under the plurality's limited approach the Court of Appeals erred
in refusing to balance the relevant interests.
Moreover, the outcome of the plurality's balancing was colored
by its rejection of any affirmative action plan that is not aimed at
remedying a manifest imbalance in an employer's work force. It
thus concludes that the harm suffered by Respondent is not out-
weighed by the benefits of some racial diversity in the Business
Education Department at Piscataway High School. Because a lay-
off and a refusal to employ a qualified individual are both grave
losses to the affected individual, the strength of the employer's in-
terest in affirmative action must be determinative. In cases of lay-
off and refusal to hire the adverse decision forecloses only one of
several opportunities that may be available. See Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 318-319 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the Court of
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Appeals and the plurality did not give sufficient consideration to
the Board's interest in faculty diversity, I would reverse the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals.
